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CONTENTS 2 
INDIVIDUALISATION OF INDIGENOUS TITLE IN NEW ZEALAND AND THE 
UNITED STATES: ASSIMILATION, EXPLOITATION, AND BUREAUCRATIC 
EXPANSION1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In New Zealand and the United States indigenous peoples now own only 
a small portion of the land which was once entirely theirs. In both 
countries the indigenous populatid'n is now the single most disadvantaged 
group on many measures of social well-being. This is often attributed (at 
least in part) to the loss of land. 
The most fundamental change in Maori and Indian land tenure was 
government-mandated individualisation of title. Both Indian and Maori land 
holdings were previously defined and controlled by indigenous law and 
custom: now they are held according to a system largely constructed by a 
colonial government. 
Individualisation in New Zealand preceded that in the United States by 
around 20 years. In New Zealand title was individualised by a special 
Court, while in the United States the process was controlled by the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, an executive body. Individualisation was 
standardised in the United States, with Indians getting plots of pre-
determined size, while the New Zealand system was more flexible, with 
some attempt to relate the blocks awarded to actual holdings before 
individualisation. 
1 I would like to thank the members of my LL. M seminar group, and Richard Boast our 
lecturer, for useful discussions of earlier versions of this paper. I also thank Justine O'Reilly 
for her invaluable criticisms and suggestions. Errors and ommissions are my responsibility. 
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The details of the process differed between the two countries, but their 
character, aims and effects were similar. This paper examines why the 
Governments of New Zealand and the United States decided to 
individualise indigenous title in the way they did. Three theories are 
examined: 
assimilation: the government believed that the social good would 
be best served by bringing the indigenous people into the 
European way of life, afid believed that an important step in this 
process was transforming indigenous title along European lines; 
exploitation: settlers desired to use indigenous resources without 
the consent of the indigenous owners, and individualisation was 
designed to assist them; 
bureaucratic expansion: bureaucrats and judges influenced the 
development of the law and practice of individualisation, in order 
to maximise their own welfare. 
Overview: the aim of this paper is examine how well the different theories 
explain the historical events in each country. Part 2 outlines the situation 
before individualisation in each country. Part 3 summarises the passage 
of the Acts allowing for individualisation, their implementation and affects. 
Parts 4 describes the theories of assimilation, exploitation, and 
bureaucratic expansion, which are then evaluated in Part 5. In Part 6 I 
present my conclusion. I find that a crude exploitation theory is not 
consistent with the evidence. The most likely explanation is that 
individualisation in both countries was the product of a compromise 
between land-hungry settlers, self-interested bureaucrats and judges, and 
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altruistic reformers influenced by the theological and anthropological 
theories of the day. 
Disclaimer: this paper covers three possible explanations for the actions 
of the governments. It does not address the views or responses of the 
indigenous peoples, nor does it cover in detail the effects of 
individualisation on the indigenous society. Considerable work could be 
done here. In particular, the debate between Parsonson and Ballara about 
the effects of the Native Land Court on Maori society, could benefit from 
cross-fertilisation with McChesney's argument that individualisation of itself 
did not harm the American Indians. 
2. THE SITUATION BEFORE INDIVIDUALISATION: UNITED STATES AND 
NEW ZEALAND 
2.1 Indigenous peoples and settler governments 
Before individualisation in either country, the main method of transferring 
land from the indigenous owners to the settlers was by treaty (in the 
United States) or deed (in New Zealand) between a tribe and the settler 
government. Typically these treaties or deeds involved the tribe ceding 
land to the government in exchange for money, goods, and guarantees of 
certain rights and reservations. 
Readers will be familiar with the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi and the 
debate on the legal relations between the Crown and Maori in the period 
between in 1840 and 1860. 
In the United States, the federal Government adopted the British legal 
theory that it could acquire land by treaty, and by right of conquest in 'just 
wars'. After 1812, the Government adopted a policy of removing Indians 
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west of the Mississippi. Although initially removals were voluntary, later 
some were forced. During this period it was thought that separation 
between the Indians and whites could be permanent. The land west of 
the Mississippi was regarded as the Great American Desert, unfit for 
white habitation.2 
Continuing settler hunger for land, however, pushed the frontier ever 
further west, so that some tribes (e.g. the Delaware) endured as many as 
four removals in a single lifetime. Westward immigration to California and 
Oregon, accelerated by the 1848 discovery of gold in California, increased 
the pressure to open the Indian territory between the eastern and western 
settlements. 
In both countries, desire to open up the land for European settlement 
generated conflict between settlers and government on the one hand, and 
the indigenous owners on the other. 
The New Zealand government and various Maori tribes were at war with 
each other in the 1860s. Even when the war was over, there was a 'New 
Zealand frontier': the 'autaki line' around the limits of the Maori-controlled 
King Country, an independent State two thirds the size of Belgium. Thus 
when individualisation started in New Zealand in the 1860s, much of the 
country was owned and controlled by Maori. 
Similarly the 'American Frontier' was a military area. When 
individualisation started in the United States in the 1880s, much of the 
land west of the Mississippi was still Indian Country. 
2 This section is summarised from Parker, L. Native American Estate: the Struggle over Indian 
and Hawaiian Lands, 1989 University of Hawaii Press pp 25-47. 
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2.2 Tenurial and economic systems 
2.2.1 Overview 
Despite the cultural differences between Maori and Indian (and indeed 
between different tribes within each country), there are similarities 
between the indigenous land tenure systems of each country. 
'Ownership' of land connotes a bundle rights with respect to land, 
including the right to occupy the- land, enjoy its fruits, exclude others from 
the land, and alienate it. In English law, the entire bundle of rights in any 
given block of land is generally held by one individual. 
Among both Maori, and Indians, some of these right could be held by 
individuals or lower level collectives, while other rights were held by 
higher levels of collectivity. Thus title to the land, in terms of ability to 
cede or permanently alienate it, was generally held by the tribe , while 
rights to use, and exclude others from a given piece of land could be 
held by particular sub-groups, families, or individuals. These rights were 
often dependent on actual use or occupation. In many cases they could 
be bequeathed or exchanged by their owners, subject to the tribal over-
right.3 
Economic motivation in European society generally occurred at the 
individual or family level. Economic motivation and organisation among 
Indians and Maori occurred both at these levels and higher levels of 
collectivity. 
3 Parsonson, A. "The Pursuit of Mana" in The Oxford History of New Zealand, Clarendon 
Press/Oxford University Press 1981 p 147; Asher, G. & Naulls, D Maori Land Planning Paper 
No.29, New Zealand Planning Council, PO Box 5066, Wellington 1987 p 5; Parker, L. 
Native American Estate: the Struggle over Indian and Hawaiian Lands, University of Hawaii 
Press 1989 pp 8-23; Cohen, F. Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 1942, 1986 reprint, Five 
Rings Corporation p 208. 
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2.2.2 Indian 
In the United States, Cohen writes that, 
"in the vast majority of cases Indian economic pursuits were carried on 
directly with individual rewards in view .... agriculture was certainly but 
rarely a communal undertaking." [Cohen, F. Handbook of Federal Indian 
Law, 1942, 1986 reprint, Five Rings Corporation p.208]. 
On the other hand, sharing food and other necessities was common 
among many Indian groups, either directly by inviting families whose 
crops had failed to share in another family's harvest, or indirectly by 
communal access to food gathering areas. 4 
In some areas prior to individualisation, Indians {often those of mixed 
blood) were experimenting with European ways, including adopting 
farming, and modifying traditional rights and values to suit their changed 
circumstances. Many Indian groups were farming successfully.5 
Property rights suitable for an agricultural economy were evolving. While 
legal title vested in the tribe, families' exclusive use of tilled or fenced 
land was recognised. Livestock was individually owned, and Government 
efforts to establish common herds in some instances were resisted. In 
farming areas, 5 - 15 acre blocks of the reservation were farmed by 
single families, while in ranching areas, individually owned herds were 
4 Parker pp 25-47. 
5 Carlson L. "Land Allotment and the Decline of American Indian Farming" Explorations in 
Economic History 1981 pp 137-143 
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grazed on communal land.6 The encouragement of Government agents 
was instrumental in promoting Indian farming, but contrary to the 
expectations of the agents and reformers, many successful farmers 
continued to embrace Indian culture.7 
2.2.3 Maori 
Maori enthusiastically engaged in trade up to the 1850s. Some iwi sold or 
mortgaged their land to finance_jwi business ventures. These ventures 
included large-scale horticulture, pastoral and grain farming, milling, and 
ship ownership.8 Economic motivation occurred at the individual, whanau, 
and higher levels. 
Maori promoted a number of forms of land ownership, including 
individualisation.9 Some Maori were legally sophisticated, and there was 
debate about the legal forms of land ownership most suited to iwi 
development. 10 
s Carlson pp 131-2 
7 Carlson p 138 
8 Wheeler B. Review of Maori Economic Development 1990, cited by permission of the Maori 
Development Corporation. p.13, Waitangi Tribunal Orakei Report, Department of Justice, 
Wellington, 1987 (Orakei) p.19, Firth, R. Economics of the New Zealand Maori, Parsonson 
p.153. 
9 Parsonson p. 153, Ballara, A "The Pursuit of Mana? A Re-evaluation of the Process of Land 
Alienations by Maoris 1840-1890" p.534. 
10 Orakei p.40-42 
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3. INTRODUCTION OF INDIVIDUALISATION 
3.1 New Zealand 
Individualisation in New Zealand was done by the Native Land Court. This 
was provided for in the Native Land Act 1862, which contemplated 
informal, local Courts, with extensive Maori input. It started operation in 
Kaipara, on the initiative of John Rogan, Land Purchase Officer for the 
area. Local chiefs formed a par:1-el of Assessors to determine title. 
According to a contemporary newspaper report they were, 
"well suited to the important task they had to perform. They well 
know that all responsibility will fall on themselves should they 
award certificates to any but the rightful owner - hence the 
examinations are extremely minute, and well and ably conducted." 
[The Daily Southern Cross, 30 June 1864).11 
The Government officially proclaimed the Act in operation in December 
1864, and appointed Judges and Assessors in three districts. 
The appointment of F.D. Fenton as Chief Judge in January 1865 meant 
the end of the informal, local Courts before they had a chance to really 
start. He reorganised the Court along the lines of the Supreme Court, with 
formal procedures, and no requirements for local representation or 
expertise.12 In 1865 Parliament passed a new Act, ratifying the more 
formal, Europeanised Court Fenton had established. 
The Native Land Act 1865 provided that Maori who claimed an interest in 
a piece of land could apply to the Court for the award of a legal Crown 
11 Ward, A. a show of justice, University of Auckland Bindery, New Zealand 1973 p 180. 
12 Ward p.180. 
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grant [s.21 ]. On such an application, the Court was required to hold a 
public sitting [s.22] to ascertain "the right title estate or interest of the 
applicant and of all other claimants to or in the land ... " [s.23]. The Court 
would award the block to up to ten people. Blocks larger than 5,000 acres 
could be awarded to a tribe as a whole, although in practice the Court 
seldom did this. Blocks could be subdivided if the owners wished [s.24]. 
Because the Court heard only the evidence and claims presented to it, 
-owners who did not appear before the Court could be dispossessed by 
rival claimants or co-owners who did go to the Court. This judicial 
dispossession was exacerbated by the practice of awarding blocks in 
which more than ten people had an interest, to ten only as absolute 
owners. 
It was largely in response to these problems that Parliament passed the 
Native Land Act 1867. This Act required the Court to make the awardees 
of the block representatives for other people interested in the land, with 
all owners' names to be recorded [s.17]. The Court under Chief Judge 
Fenton, however, claimed to have discretion over whether to apply s.17, 
and continued to award land to ten owners only. 13 In further response, 
Parliament passed the Native Land Act 1873, requiring the Court to list all 
the owners of the land on a memorial of ownership, and demanding the 
consent of all owners for-any sale. 
Today, almost all Maori land has been individualised by the Court. The 
Court (renamed the Maori Land Court) still exists and determines disputes 
and other matters arising from Maori land. 
13 Ward p.216. 
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3.2 The United States 
Congress passed the General Allotment (Dawes) Act in 1887. This had 
been preceded by a number of Acts individualising Indian land in 
particular areas, for example the Omaha Severalty Act 1882. The Dawes 
Act created a uniform system for individualising Indian land across the 
country, to be administered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA, often 
referred to as the Indian Office). The system was applied to successive 
Indian lands, at the discretion of the BIA. 
The Act provided for a grant of 160 acres to each family head, with 80 
acres for each single person over 18 years of age and to each orphan 
under 18, and 40 acres for other single persons under 18. Once the Act 
was applied to any reservation, the residents had four years to select 
their allotment from the available blocks. If the Indians did not select their 
land in this time, officials would award them a block. 
The allotments were held in trust by the government for 25 years after 
their award. During this time the land could not be alienated or 
encumbered. At the end of the 25 year period, the allotment matured into 
a full fee simple. At the same time, citizenship was to be conferred upon 
the allottees. The Act also provided that other Indians who had 
abandoned their tribes and adopted "the habits of civilised life" would be 
made citizens.14 
In 1891 the Act was amended so that all members of a tribe would 
receive a uniform 80 acres. This was intended to provide better for 
children, women without husbands, etc. Leasing of land for up to 3 years 
by Indians who were unable to work it themselves was also allowed, 
14 Cohen pp.207-208. 
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subject to prior approval by the Secretary of the Interior. The apparent 
aim was to allow Indians who could not make a living from farming to 
nevertheless survive on income from their land, while the need for the 
Secretary's approval was designed to protect Indians from exploitation. 15 
Initially the leasing exception was applied cautiously. Over the following 
decades, however, restrictions on alienation were progressively loosened, 
both through changing administrative practice, and through further 
-legislative amendments. 16 For example, the Burke Act 1906 allowed the 
Secretary of the Interior to terminate the trust period {in other words, 
allow full alienability) "whenever he shall be satisfied that any Indian 
allottee is competent and capable of managing his or her affairs ... ". 
In 1914 the Secretary for the Interior adopted the practice of issuing fee 
patents {i.e. terminating the trust) to Indians who had not asked for them, 
and even to Indians who had asked that the trust be maintained, so long 
as the bureaucracy was satisfied that the Indian was competent. In 1919 
the Secretary sped things up further by assuming that Indians of less than 
half blood were competent. 17 
In 1934 the Indian Reorganisation Act {Wheeler-Howard Act) ended 
allotment, and extended indefinitely the trust period for existing 
allotments.18 
1s Cohen pp 212-213. 
1s Cohen pp 213-4. 
17 These practices (which were discontinued in 1921) are now the subject of breach of trust 
actions against the federal government, seeking not only money damages, but also a return 
of the land to Indian trust status, and the ejectment of current landowners. Lafave, L. 1984 
"South Dakota's Forced Fee Indian Land Claims: Will Landowners be Liable for Government's 
Wrongdoing?" 1984 South Dakota Law Review 59 pp 59-102. 
18 Mcchesney, F. "Government as Definer of Property Rights: Indian Lands, Ethnic Externalities, 
and Bureaucratic Budgets" The Journal of Legal Studies June 1990 pp 306-7. 
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3.3 Results of individualisation 
Over the period of individualisation the total amount of Indian land held 
fell by around two thirds, from 138 million acres in 1887, to 48 million 
acres in 1934. Nearly half of the remainder was desert or semi-desert.19 
Between 1860 and 1891 , Maori land ownership fell almost 50%, from 21.4 
million acres to 11.1 million acres.20 It is reasonable to conclude that most 
of this land was sold after havi~g been through the Native Land Court.21 
In both countries, the loss of land was associated with depopulation, ill 
health, and social disharmony in the indigenous communities. 22 
The ownership of the remaining indigenous land in both countries was 
seriously fragmented through the application of European inheritance 
systems to individualised land. 
In the United States, the problem was created by Section 5 of the Dawes 
Act, which provided that succession to allotments would be determined 
"according to the laws of the state or territory where such land is located." 
This ousted the tribal descent rules, which were apparently well-defined, 
and substituted legal confusion and (since few Indians made wills) the 
laws of intestate succession . In New Zealand, the Court held in 
Papakura23 that on intestate succession, individual interests in land were 
to be divided equally among the offspring of the deceased. 
19 Cohen p.216. 
20 Asher & Naulls (Appendix). 
21 Three million acres were confiscated, of which around half was later returned [Asher & 
Naulls, Annex]. Apart from that, the main cause of alienation was sale, following grant of title 
by the Land Court. 
22 M. Sorrenson "Land Purchase Methods and their Effect on Maori Population, 1865 - 1901" 
Journal of the Polynesian Society 1956. 
23 Judgement on the Papakura Block.New Zealand Gazette, 1867 p 189 per Rogan J. 
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The result was that land which under indigenous rules would have passed 
to one or two offspring, was divided among a greater number. In time, it 
would be re-divided among the offspring of the second generation of 
owners, and so on, creating ever smaller and more uneconomic interests. 
This fragmentation remains one of the most serious impediments to 
economic use of Indian and Maori land. 
Individualisation had considerable cultural costs. Ballara argues, 
"after the passing of the Native Land Act in 1862 European 
institutions became impossible to ignore. Land in these new 
circumstances ceased to be only the turangawaewae, the ancestral 
home of the people, sustaining them with its various resources, ... 
the land acquired also a capital value, and a number on an 
ordnance survey map. This process constituted an attack on Maori 
values ... "[Ballara, A. "The Pursuit of Mana? A Re-evaluation of the 
Process of Land Alienation by Maoris, 1840-1890" p.531] 
In the United States Parker writes that, 
"Indians did not consider land a commodity to be sold or bought in 
the market place - they did not value land as a piece of real 
estate, and placed no commercial value on it." [Parker pp 8-11] 
suggesting that the individualisation of land was culturally inappropriate. 
Overall, individualisation had a serious adverse effect on Maori and 
Indians. The Tainui Maori Trust Board told the Waitangi Tribunal that, 
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"Individualisation of title in relation to land has been a burning 
issue amongst all tribes since the Treaty was signed." [Submission 
of the Tainui Maori Trust Board to the Waitangi Tribunal hearing at 
Ahipara, March 1987 [quoted in Royal Commission on Social 
Policy, April Report Val.Ill p.1981] 
While "Among specialist in Indian law and history, apparently no one has 
a good word for the allotment experience."24 
4. THEORIES OF INDIVIDUALISATION 
There is agreement that the actual historical process of individualisation 
was disastrous for the indigenous people of both countries.25 Why did the 
United States and New Zealand Governments impose it? 
4.1 Assimilation 
4.1.1 The United States 
Hoxie, in his book A Final Promise26, argues that the Dawes Act was the 
major piece in a grand project to reshape Indian society, and to draw 
Indians into the main stream of modern life. The influences shaping the 
project, according to Hoxie, were developments in anthropological thought, 
and a kind of constitutional zeitgeist. 
Lewis Henry Morgan "easily the country's most respected anthropologist", 
published his major study Ancient Society in 1877. This codified his 
influential ideas that all human societies develop through three stages: 
24 Mcchesney p.307. 
2s Although there is debate about whether individualisation of title is inherently harmful to the 
interests of Maori and Indians, see especially McChesney. 
26 Hoxie, F. A Final Promise; the Campaign to Assimilate the lndi.an, 1880-1920, 1984 
University of Nebraska Press, p 17. 
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savagery (roughly equivalent to hunter-gatherer), barbarism (the start of 
settled agriculture), and civilisation. Vital in this progression was the 
transformation of property relations from communal to individual. 
In this intellectual climate, the question, naturally, was whether it would be 
possible to hasten a culture's development through these stages. John 
Welesly Powell, a disciple of Morgan and head of the Bureau of 
Ethnology, thought it was. He advocated "a condensation of the social 
evolutionist blueprint: separate Indians from their homes and their past, 
divide their lands into individual parcels, make them citizens, and draw 
them into American society."27 
Another of Morgan's disciples, Anne Fletcher, went out to put the theory 
into action. She visited and studied the Omahas of Nebraska, and 
returned to Washington in 1881 with signatures from 53 tribespeople (out 
of a total of 1,121) asking for part of the reservation to be sold to finance 
the development of individual homesteads on the rest. Congress obliged 
with the Omaha Severalty Act 1882, one of the prototypes for the Dawes 
Act.2s 
The first stage in this blueprint was the intended transformation of Indians 
into a race of farmers. The size of the plots awarded was the same as 
those given to white settlers under the Homesteads Act. Government 
agents on the reservations sent anxious reports, recording the Indians' 
progress as agriculturalists. 29 
21 Hoxie p.24. 
2a Fletcher returned to Nebraska to supervise allotment among the people she had studied, and 
later did the same for groups of the Winnebagos and Nez Perce [Hoxie pp 25-29). 
29 Carlson "Land Allotment and the Decline of American Indian Farming" 
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According to Hoxie, the drive for assimilation was part of a reaction to the 
break-down of divisions in American society after the Civil War. As society 
became more complex and interdependent, the social segregation of all 
groups (including Indians), was no longer tenable. A new social ideology 
was needed to preserve nationhood in a diverse society. This was 
provided by drawing on the Republican constitutional ideals of freedom 
and equality before the law. 
Official and open discrimination against Catholics, Chinese, and Blacks, 
continued, and was politically popular among the majority. The Indians 
were a relatively small minority, living in isolated areas. The settlers who 
might have approved of discrimination against Indians had little political 
representation. Indian policy provided a low cost way for Republican 
ideology to make good. "Assimilated natives would be proof positive that 
America was an open society, where obedience and accommodation to 
the wishes of the majority would be rewarded with social equality."30 
The coupling of social evolutionism with the ideal of equality before the 
law made a programme of Indian cultural advancement, through the gift of 
individual property rights and United States citizenship, appear progressive 
and humanitarian. It was believed the natural result of this project would 
be complete assimilation of the Indians to civilised white Anglo-Saxon 
Protestant culture. The taking of 'surplus' Indian lands for white settlement 
could be easily justified in this schema by the return gift of full 
membership of a modern society, and by the fact that title to the 
remaining lands would be more secure than it had been. 
30 Hoxie p.34. 
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4.1 .2 New Zealand 
While the New Zealand political and social context was quite different, the 
basic concept of native progress through assimilation prevailed in both 
countries. The Hon. Henry Sewell told the House of Representatives 
"The other great object [of the Native Lands Act] was the 
detribalisation of the Maoris - to destroy, if possible, the principle of 
communism which ran through the whole of their institutions, upon 
which their whole social system was based, and which stood as a 
barrier in the way of all attempts to amalgamate the Maori race 
into our social and political system." [IX New Zealand Parliamentary 
Debates p.361 (1870)131 
The idea of a linear cultural evolution, with the indigenous people as 
savages, and settlers as civilised, was equally influential in New Zealand. 
Richmond (a former Native Affairs Minister) told Parliament that the 
settler's desire for land 
" ... could not be properly called greed. It was not individual wealth 
he was grasping; he was indulging in the healthy wish for the 
spread of civilisation." [NZ Parliamentary Debates 1864-6 p 349]32 
As in the United States, the enlightenment and assimilation of Maori was 
to be done by land individualisation and the gift of equality before the 
law.33 
The exact form assimilation was to take was less clear in New Zealand 
than in the United States. There was some attempt to establish Maori as 
31 Waitangi Tribunal Orakei Report (Wai-9), 1987, Department of Justice, Wellington p.30 (cited 
as Orakei). 
32 in Ward p.187. 
33 Ward pp 183-185. 
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farmers, with Native Department Officers introducing them to new skills 
and crops. This was never the overriding concern that it was in the United 
States, however, and initial failures by officialdom to interest Maori in 
farming strengthened the notion that they should become labourers and 
tradespeople.34 
Chief Judge Fenton's explicit and publicly stated aim was to transform the 
highest ranked Maori into a sort of gentry, and the rest into a class of 
landless labourers.35 This was popular among humanitarians and in the 
press, the feeling being that Maori would be better off if they could be 
prevented from living in communal sloth, and be made to work for a 
living.36 
Thus while the rhetoric of individualisation in the United States was firmly 
based on establishing each Indian securely on his or her own plot of land, 
the logic of assimilation in New Zealand pointed toward separating most 
Maori from their land altogether. 
4.3 Exploitation 
Individualisation did not produce the hoped for social and economic 
development of indigenous peoples in either the United States or New 
Zealand. Some recent writers have argued that this was never its real 
intention. They argue that individualisation as just one incident in the long 
history of exploitation of indigenous resources by European colonisers. 
Parker, in her book Native American Estate,37 portrays the entire course 
of white-Indian relations as driven by settler land-hunger, sated and 
34 Ward p.258. 
3s Ward pp 213-216. 
36 e.g. Ward p.214. 
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legitimised by federal force, treaty, and statute. 
In this vision, first the bulk of the land was taken in exchange for 
reservations, then allotment took the 'surplus' reservation land in 
exchange for individual plots, and finally the allotments were lost when 
the restrictions on alienation were lifted, leaving Indians with virtually 
nothing.38 
A similar story is told in New Zealand. Asher & Naulls write in Maori 
Land, 
"Detaching the Maori from their lands through legal means was 
slower, but in the long run was to prove just as sure" [Asher, G. & 
Naulls, D. Maori Land Planning Paper No.29, 1987, New Zealand 
Planning Council, PO Box 5066, Wellington, p.28] 
In her article "The Pursuit of Mana? A Re-evaluation of the Process of 
Land Alienation by Maoris 1840-1890" ,39 Ballara asserts that European 
land acquisitions did have a 'fatal impact' on Maori, and that the Native 
Land Court was one of the worst culprits. She states 
"The legislators were aware that they were building into the land 
registration system inequities which would result in excessive land 
loss to Maori landowners." [Ballara p.536] 
37 Parker, L. Native American Estate: the Struggle over Indian and Hawaiian Lands, 1989 
University of Hawaii Press. 
38 Cohen p.216. 
39 Ballara, A. "The Pursuit of Mana? A Re-evaluation of the Process of Land Alienation by 
Maoris, 1840-1890". 
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European traders took the land in settlement of debts the Maori owners 
had run up, and at times falsified the books or used other underhand 
practices. Land was sold to meet the survey and other costs associated 
with bringing land before the Court. Perhaps worst of all, the system 
allowed disputed land to be brought before the Court, awarded to the 
claimant, and promptly sold, even though someone else had a better 
claim to it. This 'maelstrom of uncertainty'40 was a major factor prompting 
sales. 
Similar underhand practices and speculation were implicated in purchases 
of Indian lands.41 
This vision of individualisation as exploitation is grounded in modern 
anthropological theory: theory developed partly in response to the failure 
of the allotment system which earlier anthropologists advocated. 
Anthropologists discarded their assimilationist cultural diffusion models as 
the Indian population remained isolated from the American mainstream, 
contrary to their predictions.42 A new school of anthropologists adopted 
the increasingly influential set of dependency/ under-development/ core-
periphery/ world-systems models associated with Baran, Frank and 
Wallerstein.43 
These theories emphasise the importance of imperialist colonial centres in 
the underdevelopment of colonised peripheries. The colonising society is 
40 Ballara p 319 
41 Cohen p.209. 
42 Snipp, M. "The Changing Political and Economic Status of the American Indians: from 
CaptLve Nations to Internal Colonies" American Journal of Economics and Sociology April 
1986 45 pp 145-157 p.148. 
43 Snipp p 149-151 
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assumed to develop by extracting resources from the indigenous society, 
which is consequently underdeveloped. 
Generalising this theory to the United States and New Zealand, it is 
argued that the development of the modern sector in those countries was 
fed by the exploitation of indigenous land. Individualisation was part of the 
exploitation. The result was impoverishment and underdevelopment of 
Maori and Indian culture. The present disadvantaged status of Indian and 
Maori is consistent with this theory. 
Turning to the evidence of historical intent, it is clear that some of the 
important figures involved in individualisation in New Zealand did see it, 
as primarily or in part, as a means to allow settlers access to Maori lands 
on advantageous terms. 
FitzGerald (Native Minister for part of 1865) "frankly stated that the Bill 
was a compromise, and in bringing it forward 'he had to give up some of 
the views he had held' . In other words he was surrendering to speculator 
pressures. "44 
Whitmore, an erstwhile Civil Commissioner, suggested that McLean, 
"Close all bargains with Natives so as to be as little hurt by [the] 
new Native Land Act and when it is proclaimed get hold of all you 
can." [Whitmore to. McLean, early 1865, McLean MSS. , 414, no.3]45 
Lewis, who was McLean's private secretary and later Under-Secretary of 
the Native Department46 finally admitted, 
44 Ward p. 185, citing Parliamentary Debates, 1864-6, p.370 
45 in Ward p.185. 
46 Ward p.281 . 
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"the whole object ... was to enable alienation for settlement. Unless 
this object is attained, the Court serves no good purpose, and the 
Natives would be better without it, as, in my opinion, fairer native 
occupation would be had under the Maoris' own customs and 
usages without any intervention whatever from outside." [Appendix 
to the Journal of the House of Representatives, 1891, sess. II G-1 
p.145]47 
-
In the United States, according to Cohen in his major Handbook of 
Federal Indian Law,48 the leading proponents of allotment were inspired 
by 'the highest motives'. However he also notes a minority report of the 
House Indian Affairs Committee on an earlier version of what became the 
Dawes Act stating, 
47 in Ward p. 182. 
"The real aim of this Bill is to get at the Indian lands and open 
them up for settlement. The provisions for the apparent benefit of 
the Indian are but the pretext to get at his land and occupy them . 
... If this were done in the name of greed it would be bad enough; 
but to do it in the name of humanity, and under the cloak of an 
ardent desire to promote the Indian's welfare by making him more 
like ourselves, whether he will or not, is infinitely worse." [House 
Report No. 1567, May 28, 1880. 46th Congress, 2nd session 10]49 
48 Cohen, F. Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 1942, 1986 reprint , Five Rings Corporation, 
p.208. 
49 in Cohen p.209. 
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Without direct admissions from the supporters of individualisation in the 
United States, the evidence is less certain, but it likely that in both 
countries the desire to obtain indigenous lands for settlement more easily 
than before, and with less regard for the wishes of its owners, was a 
significant motivating force. 
4.4 Bureaucratic expansion 
4.4.1 United States 
The most recent theory explains the history of allotment in the United 
States by the self-interest, not of an entire imperialist nation, but of one 
small part of that nation , the bureaucrats in the Indian Office. The central 
thesis of McChesney's article "Government as Definer of Property Rights: 
Indian Lands, Ethnic Externalities, and Bureaucratic Budgets",50 is that 
"Only one hypothesis, growth of BIA (Bureau of Indian Affairs] 
budgets, is demonstrably consistent with all chronological phases of 
Indian land privatisation ." (McChesney p.300] 
McChesney argues that while settlers and politicians benefited at different 
times from different aspects of the Dawes Act, the people with the 
strongest and most enduring interest were the bureaucrats. 
McChesney follows Niskanen51 and other economists of the 'public choice' 
school in assuming that bureaucrats maximise their own utility, and that 
bureaucratic budgets are a proxy for that utility. 
so Mcchesney, F. "Government as Definer of Property Rights: Indian Lands, Ethnic Externalities, 
and Bureaucratic Budgets" The Journal of Legal Studies June 1990 pp 297-335. 
51 Bureaucracy and Representative Government (1971) 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
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The history of the Act, including features which remain inexplicable in 
other theories, are explained as contributing to the bureaucratic drive for 
increased funding. First the initial decision to introduce allotment 
increased the workload of the BIA, since they did the allotting. Immediate 
alienability might have suited the white settlers, or indeed the 
assimilationists better, but the 25 year trust period gave the BIA an extra 
load of administrative work. 
-
When alienation was freed up, each lease or early termination of the trust 
period required bureaucratic approval, further increasing the demands on 
the Bureau. The speed up of allotments, too, required increasing 
bureaucratic resources. 
The fragmentation of estates through succession increased the BIA's 
administrative workload. For example, in the recent case of Hodel v Irving 
[481 United States at 713],52 the Supreme Court commented on the fact 
that the tract of land in question was worth $8,000, produced $1080 in 
annual income between the 439 owners, and cost the BIA $17,600 
annually to administer. 
Initially, increasing allotment required an increases in the BIA's budget, 
but in time decreases in Indian land holdings would decrease the BIA's 
work. There would come a time when BIA budgets could only be 
protected by halting allotment and alienation. This accounts for the 
administrative slow down in the 1920 s, and eventual repeal of the Act in 
1934. With allotments frozen, the passage of Indian land from 
bureaucratic control could be halted, and the work of the BIA preserved . 
52 quoted in McChesney p.324. 
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Looking at changes in the BIA budget, McChesney finds that it jumps by 
20% when allotment was introduced, and again by 20% when it was 
terminated. Fairly sophisticated econometric tests of the relationship 
between the BIA budget and legislative changes, show a significant 
positive correlation.53 
4.4.2 New Zealand 
No comparable work has been -clone on the budgets of the Native Land 
Court organisation. What research there has been on the incentives 
facing the Native Land Court operatives has focused on the views and 
actions of Chief Judge Fenton. The evidence is broadly consistent with a 
bureaucratic expansion theory. 
Ward states that land legislation was heavily influenced by Fenton's 
efforts "to gain for himself and his Court as much influence over Maori 
policy as possible."54 
Contemporary descriptions are of a Court more concerned with its own 
prestige and power than anything else. Te Wheoro, a former Land Court 
Assessor, wrote 
"It would appear, when a block was going through the Native Land 
Court, as if the land was owned by the court itself, and not by the 
litigants." [Appendix to the Journal of the House of Representatives, 
1885, G-1, p 29]55 
53 Mcchesney pp 327-334. 
54 Ward p.251. 
55 in Ward p.255. 
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The change from the Court proposed in the original Native Land Act 1862 
to that eventually established by the 1865 Act is a clear case of 
bureaucratic empire building. 
Fenton himself had first suggested the principle embodied in the 1862 
Act, namely that local Chiefs should meet with local Magistrates to work 
out land boundaries in their area.56 When he was appointed to the Court 
himself however, he immediately set about elevating the position of the 
Court, and himself with it. 
Under the 1862 Act the Court was to be run by part-time57 local 
magistrates [s.5]. In the 1865 Act they became full time Judges with 
nation-wide jurisdiction, on an annual salary of 600 pounds [s.7] plus 
travelling allowances [s.9]. The Court itself became a Court of Record 
[s.5] with powers to punish for contempt. All magistrates under the 1862 
were formally equal: under the 1865 Act, Fenton became a Chief Judge 
on a salary of 800 pounds annually. 
Fenton proposed a Native Reserves Bill in 1869, which would have given 
the Court power to set up and administer reserves and made the Court 
trustee for the interests of Maori minors. This would have significantly 
increased the Court's workload. Parliament however suspected that 
Fenton's 'reforms' were motivated more by self-aggrandisement than by 
altruism.58 The Native Reserves Bill was never passed. 
Other factors, though, are harder to explain with an empire-building 
theory. Section 17 of the 1867 Act, requiring the Court to determine all 
the owners of a block and register their names and interests, appeared to 
ss Ward p. 180. 
~ Ward p. 180. 
sa Ward p.251. 
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increase the Court's workload, especially since provision was made for 
the owners to apply to the Court for partition of the land at a later date. 
Contrary to a budget-maximising theory, however, Fenton refused to apply 
s.17, or even inform Maori of its existence.59 Similarly the 1873 
requirement to list all owners on a Memorial of Ownership superficially fits 
an expansionist theory, but in fact was brought in to thwart Fenton's 
insistence on awarding blocks to only ten owners absolutely, and Fenton 
did his best to undermine this Act also.60 
It may be that promoting his own vision of society was at least as 
important as maximising the Court's budget to Fenton. His mix of twisted 
altruism and self interest was summed up by a colleague writing to 
McLean 
"That man's life is one constant scheme [;] what might once have 
been Utopian enthusiasm has turned into scheming for self-
advancement & specious toadying" [Drummond Hay to Mclean c. 
1870 Mclean MSS 257 no.14]61 
Alternatively, Fenton's resistance to any changes protecting Maori rights 
or slowing alienation may have come from his desire to retain the support 
of the majority of settlers and influential land speculators, (it certainly had 
this effect)62 or indeed with an eye to his own future land deals. On 
retirement from the Court, he was largely responsible for the acquisition of 
Ngati Whakuae lands and the development of the township of Rotorua.63 
It was Fenton who suggested that the Orakei block (incorporating Bastion 
sg Orakei p.35. 
60 Ward pp 255-6. 
61 in Ward p.217. 
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Point) be developed as part of Auckland, and it has been speculated that 
in doing so he was seeking further employment for himself.64 The fewer 
complications in alienation, the easier and more profitable such deals 
were likely to be. 
In conclusion, much of the evidence concerning the process of 
individualisation in New Zealand is consistent with a theory of judicial self-
interest. 
5. EVALUATION OF THE THEORIES 
5.1 Bureaucratic65 expansion 
It is striking that each major legislative change in the United States 
increased the Indian Office's budget. Equally, there is little doubt that the 
form of individualisation in New Zealand was greatly influenced by 
Fenton's pursuit of his own interests. Nevertheless, there is much that 
remains unexplained by this theory. 
Most importantly, it cannot answer the fundamental question of why 
individualisation was introduced. Before individualisation commenced, 
there were no bureaucrats with an interest in promoting it. 
The Bureau of Indian Affairs already existed, and the men appointed to 
the Land Court were involved in Government work with Maori , before 
individualisation. These officers must have had many budget increasing 
projects available. The BIA could have redoubled its efforts in supplying 
rations, giving farming advice, or negotiating sales. The Civil 
62 Ward p.217. 
63 Ward p.288, Orakei p.48. 
64 Orakei p.48. 
65 I use the term 'bureaucratic' to include judges, unless the context indicates otherwise. 
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Commissioners and Resident Magistrates who were appointed to the 
Court in New Zealand could have worked on extending British criminal 
law to Maori communities, or co-operated to strengthen local runanga, to 
give but a few examples. If we want to know why, out of all these 
projects, individualisation was pursued with such vigour, a bare budget 
maximisation theory does not help. 
The correlation which Mcchesney finds between BIA budgets and 
-
individualisation does little to flesh out the details of causation. 
Mcchesney tells us that, 
"every important change in federal Indian policy was justified as 
expediting the ultimate disappearance of the Indian Office." 
[McChesney p.303] 
but finds that in fact every change increased the BIA's budget. Were the 
Indian Office bureaucrats Machiavellian liars? Or was the contradiction 
between their words and acts mediated by a justificatory ideology? 
The evidence about New Zealand is based on reports of ideas and 
motivations. This raises questions about historical causation. The elevation 
of the Land Court seems directly attributable to Fenton. Would it have 
remained a local and low key institution were it not for him, or are the 
forces of bureaucratic expansion ubiquitous and independent of 
personality? The Act of 1867 and 1873 appeared to increase the Court's 
workload, but were promoted by McLean of the Native Department to 
curb the Court's power. Was this simply a clash of personalities, a 
genuine desire to protect Maori on McLean's part, or a struggle for 
supremacy between rival bureaux which would have happened regardless 
of the people and issues involved? 
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Similar questions could be asked in the United States context. 
To understand the causes of individualisation, we want to know what the 
people involved actually thought, and how this affected their actions. In 
New Zealand we have evidence that the key bureaucrat was motivated 
largely by the desire for self-advancement, although it is not clear that this 
translated into increasing budgets. In the United States we know that the 
effect of individualisation was to increase the budgets of the bureaucrats 
involved, but not whether this was their conscious intention. 
In both contexts, the theory in under-determinative. It is consistent with 
what happened, but also with many things which did not happen. We 
must look elsewhere for why of all the budget-increasing possibilities, 
individualisation was pursued. 
5.2 Exploitation 
The Crown has been guilty of taking Maori land, notably (but not 
exclusively) in confiscations under the New Zealand Settlements Act 
1863. Indian land was also expropriated, both by military action, and by 
statute following the 1903 Lone Wolf decision, which held that Congress 
was free to take Indian land even when it had been guaranteed by treaty. 
Most writers view individualisation and its concomitants as essentially the 
same as confiscation. 
Ballara66 describes a Maori request to Government for an investment loan 
secured over land as 'bureaucratic looting', and similarly lambastes the 
Native Land Act provisions for payment in land of survey costs and other 
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fees. 
This belief that all land alienation is exploitation has become dominant 
among policy advisers also. In its wholesale condemnation of the loss of 
Maori land, the Royal Commission on Social Policy stated, 
"Maori land has been alienated by confiscation, mortgage, lease, 
compulsory purchase, or sale." [April Report Val.Ill p.196] 
lhi Consultants, in their brief on~Maori economic development, put the 
Land Court under the heading "Expropriation", and write 
"Confiscation, title individualisation, direct purchase, targeted laws -
all possible means were exploited in breaking the Maori control of 
these resources." [p.40-41] 
This simplistic approach obscures the facts that alienations can be 
harmful or beneficial, depending on the circumstances and conditions, and 
that individualisation itself did not remove land from indigenous control. 
It is true that the 'maelstrom of uncertainty' unleashed by the Native Land 
Court caused many Maori to sell. The break down in trust and increase in 
divisiveness caused by the Court was disastrous for Maori. But a theory 
based solely on government and settler desire to grasp indigenous 
resources as cheaply as possible does not explain why the government 
invested in the expensive machinery of the Court, or required settlers to 
pay Maori for their land. 
Likewise, the premise that government action was designed to transfer 
66 "The Pursuit of Mana? A Re-evaluation of the Process of Land Alienation by Maoris, 1840-
1890" pp 533-534. 
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land as quickly as possible from Maori to Pakeha cannot explaln why 
Parliament passed the 1867 Act demanding that the Court ascertain all 
the owners of a block, and list their interest, or why when Fenton refused 
to apply it, the Government 
"sent hurriedly round to discover cases where the 17th Section had 
been overleaped by the Court and to obtain declarations of trust on 
the part of those Natives who had received grants for their tribes." 
[Richmond, Parliamentary Debates 1868 vol. VI p 231 ]67 
The exploitation theory explains why Fenton promoted the development of 
the Orakei block in 1898, but not why he had, as Chief Judge 20 years 
earlier, made the land inalienable.68 
Similarly in the United States, it was the Lone Wolf decision, not the 
Dawes Act which allowed the government to take 'surplus' reservation 
land without tribal consent. Allotments could not be taken in this way, but 
"had there been no allotment policy, all Indian land would have been 
available for taking."69 
Restrictions on alienability, particularly the 25 year trust period, were 
important features of the United States individualisation. This was a bar to 
economic farming by Indians. It prevented them from dividing or joining 
blocks to form more efficient units. It denied them access to loan capital, 
since they could not use their major asset as security. It prevented 
67 in Ward p.216. 
68 Orakei p.39. It is true that the Court seldom exercised its power to make land inalienable, 
and when it did, the protection was far from permanent [Orakei p.39) These facts appear to 
support the exploitation hypothesis, but in fact the existence of the power to make land inal-
ienable becomes a puzzle if the whole scheme was designed to facilitate the transfer of re-
sources from Maori to Pakeha. 
69 Mcchesney pp 12-13. 
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Indians benefiting from leasing land which was surplus to their own 
immediate needs. While quite possibly harmful to Indians, this restriction 
can not be explained by the exploitation theory, since it slowed white 
access to Indian lands. 
Nor can the fragmentation of Indian and Maori land through inheritance 
be explained by the exploitation theory. Although this by-product of 
individualisation was harmful to indigenous interests, it did nothing to 
promote acquisition of land by settlers. 
The exploitation theory is appealing since it fits the facts at the broadest 
level: that indigenous people used to own all the land, now they own little; 
and this loss of land has been associated with a worsening socio-
economic position. It also fits a simple self-interest model of government, 
and the historical fact of land speculation and dishonest practices by 
settlers. The exploitation theory goes too far however, since it implies that 
all land should have been confiscated. 
It must be supplemented by a theory which explains the limits to 
exploitation. It may be that European greed was tempered by the 
knowledge that too open a land grab would provoke conflict, the costs of 
which would outweigh the expected gains. It may be, as Douglas Hay and 
E. P. Thompson have argued,70 that for the law to serve the rulers' 
interests, it must at times live up to its promises of fairness and justice, 
and constrain the actions of those it serves. Or it may be that the 
material aspirations of some settlers and government members were 
limited by genuine humanitarian altruism on the part of their colleagues. 
10 Hay, D. "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law" in Alb ion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society 
in Eighteenth-Century England Hay, D. Linebaugh, P. Rule J. G. Thompson, E. P. & Winslow, 
C. eds. 1975; Thompson, E. P. Whigs and Hunters : The Origins of the Black Act 1975. 
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It is in the theories about the limits to exploitation, as much as in 
exploitation theory itself, that the explanation for individualisation must be 
sought. For individualisation involved only limited exploitation. 
Allotments in the United States provided protection against statutory 
takings legitimised by Lone Wolf. In New Zealand, the Land Court must 
be compared to the prevailing backdrop of land confiscation. Under the 
New Zealand Settlement Act 1863 the Crown was empowered to 
-~ 
confiscate rebels' land. In fact, land was selected for confiscation more on 
the basis of its suitability for settlement than because of anything its 
owners had done.71 
If one assumes fairness and justice as the norm, then individualisation's 
damaging effects need explanation, but if one takes exploitation and self-
interest as given, then it is the relative restraint of individualisation policies 
which has to be explained. 
5.3 Assimilation 
Both the exploitation and bureaucratic expansion theories explain complex 
historical events with simple, universal motivators. Their simplicity makes 
them powerful but under-determinative explanations. Neither can explain 
why individualisation was chosen over other courses which could have 
boosted budgets further, or transferred lands faster. The missing variable 
in both theories is the prevailing intellectual climate. 
Contemporary beliefs in progress, linear cultural evolution, the virtues of 
hard work, private property, and equality before the law, patterned the 
development of individualisation. This assimilation-patterning must be 
11 Ward p.177, Asher and Naulls p.28. 
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explored to understand the ways in which altruism and self-interest could 
be expressed in the societies in question. 
There are three broad possibilities for the relation between prevailing 
ideas of assimilation and the actual act of settlers, government, 
bureaucrats and judges: 
1. altruistic humanitarianism: that the protagonists were motivated by 
a genuine desire to benefit indigenous peoples by bringing them 
into civilisation, in accordance with the theological and 
anthropological theories of the day 
2. legitimating ideology: that, as J.K. Galbraith put it, 'the ruling ideas 
of any age are the ideas of the ruling classes' - the prevailing 
anthropological and theological theories were accepted precisely 
because they justified and legitimised acts which furthered the 
material interests of settlers, government and bureaucrats. 
3. hypocrisy: that the rhetoric of progress and assimilation was simply 
a screen which the protagonists consciously constructed to hide 
their self-interest. 
The reality was a mix of all three. Mantell, Native Minister 1864-5 and the 
man who appointed Fenton was (ironically) a genuine humanitarian, 
judging by his resignation as Native Minister over a colleague's about-face 
on the question of Maori rights to the Princes Street Reserve in Dunedin, 
and by his subsequent legislative devotion to the interests of South Island 
Maori.72 
Fenton on the other hand was an outright hypocrite, at least at times. For 
example, Ward writes, 
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"Fenton himself later claimed that that when he perceived that the 
ten nominated owners were alienating the patrimony of their hapu, 
he urged upon the Government the necessity of getting trust deeds 
executed. This was a bare faced lie." [Ward p.216] 
In the United States too, both extremes of the spectrum were 
represented. McChesney concludes that the reform movement behind 
individualisation in the United States was, 
"driven by non-pecuniary motives (for example the propagation of 
religion)," and that "Historians find little support for the claim that 
'western interests, greedy for Indian land' had any involvement in 
the Dawes Act." [McChesney p 318, citing Prucha, F.P. The Great 
Father, 1984, p.669]. 
On the other hand, Hoxie finds73 that Senator Dawes himself had shown 
little interest in Indians affairs, until he realised that joining the assimilation 
bandwagon could revive his flagging political career. 74 
The balance between the three possibilities is unclear, but in all likelihood 
most of the protagonists spent most of the time in the shifting middle 
ground. Fenton himself, for example had a real intellectual and ideological 
commitment to the system which served himself and his colleagues so 
well. Richmond's disingenuous observation in Parliament that 
individualisation would ensure that those Maori 
72 Ward p 183 
73 As Mcchesney acknowledges, p.321 . 
14 Hoxie p.29. 
- 37 -
"possessed of more real force of character would rise to a higher 
level, from the greater power of wealth which was put into their 
hands." [Parliamentary Debates 1864-6 p 349] 
is in the same mould. 
McChesney gives little evidence on the thoughts of Indian Office 
functionaries, but one may surmise that, in the nature of bureaucrats 
everywhere, they would generally find it easy to believe that spending just 
a bit more money, and providing just a little more bureaucratic control , 
would really make things better for everyone, as well as (coincidentally) 
increasing their own power and prestige. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Predictably, there are elements of truth in each theory, while none holds 
the complete answer. 
In both countries, the advent of individualisation was a compromise 
between the desire for social reform, and the wish to open up the land for 
European settlement on advantageous terms. The relationship was 
complex and interdependent. Those who desired social reforms espoused 
views which were acceptable because they served the interests of their 
own group. Those who wanted to acquire good land cheaply nevertheless 
desired a cloak of legitimacy. 
Once in place, the bureaucrats and judges administering the system 
gained a lasting interest in it, and influence over it. They significantly 
affected policy and institutions in furtherance of their own interests. 
Nevertheless, it is unlikely, at least in the New Zealand case, that the 
bureaucrats' self interest can be proxied solely by agency budgets. 
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Personal rivalries, competition between agencies, and prospects of later 
employment played a big part. In this area too, the influence of ideas was 
important. Prevailing social theory was a motivator for some, a mask for 
others, and the definer of what was possible for all. 
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